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ABSTRACT: This paper is an interim report of joint work begun
in Castelnérac & Marion (2009) on dialectic from Parmenides to
Aristotle. In the first part we present rules for dialectical games,
understood as a specific form of antilogikê developed by philosophers, and explain some of the key concepts of these dialectical
games in terms of ideas from game semantics. In the games we
describe, for a thesis A asserted by the answerer, a questioner
must elicit the answerer’s assent to further assertions B1 , B2 ,. . . ,
Bn , which form a scoreboard from which the questioner seeks to
infer an impossibility (adunaton); we explain why the questioner
must not insert any of his own assertions in the scoreboard, as
well as the crucial role the Law of Non Contradiction, and why
the games end with the inference to an impossibility, as opposed
to the assertion of ¬A. In the second part we introduce some specific characteristics of Eleatic Antilogic as a method of enquiry.
When Antilogic is used as a method of inquiry, then one must
play not only the game beginning with a given thesis A, but also
the game for ¬A as well as for A & ¬A, while using a peculiar set
of opposite predicates to generate the arguments. In our discussion we hark back to Parmenides’ Poem, and illustrate our points

with Zeno’s arguments about divisibility, Gorgias’ ontological argument from his treatise On Not-Being, and the second part of
Plato’s Parmenides. We also identify numerous links to Aristotle,
and conclude with some speculative comments on the origin of
logic.

In the twentieth century, Paul Lorenzen was the first to suggest the
idea of a game semantics in ‘Logik und Agon’ (Lorenzen 1960). As
the title indicates, Lorenzen had in mind the practice of the eristikê or
dialektikê of the ancient Greeks. Since Socrates, these words came to
acquire a variety of meanings, but they used to designate verbal bouts
between two players, a questioner and an answerer, in front of an audience, possibly with a referee. Another common name for this practice
was antilogikê or antilogic, which we chose for our title. In Plato and
Aristotle (and others before them), antilogikê refers to the practice of
contradicting, and thus equally applies to long rhetorical speeches with
opposite conclusions or the practice of arguing through short questions
and answers to lead an opponent into contradicting himself. In the
latter case, the answerer would begin with an assertion A—often, in
Plato’s dialogues, as an answer to a question of the form ‘What is X?’
raised by the questioner—and they would proceed, taking turns, with
the questioner asking short questions with yes/no answers from the
answerer. The aim of the questioner was to elicit from the answerer assent to a number of further assertions B1 ,. . . , Bn from which he would
infer ¬A, thus showing that the answerer holds an inconsistent set of
beliefs that include A. Typically, the questioner would win the bout by
driving his opponent into a contradiction; the answerer would win by
avoiding being thus caught holding a contradictory pair of claims. This
procedure, called the elenchus, was intended as a test, and it is sometimes referred to in the secondary literature as the ‘elenctic method’ or,
more confusingly, the ‘Socratic elenchus’.1
We contend that, already in Eleatic circles, philosophers used the
art of contradicting, i.e., ‘antilogic’, as a method of enquiry. The social
and political conditions under which the Greeks thus began regimenting public debates in this manner are well worth an investigation, but
this is not our aim in this paper. It is worth noting, however, that
our modern practice of cross-examination in law courts did not exist
in Ancient Greece, where pleading occurred in two opposing speeches.
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(Nevertheless, as we shall see, philosophers were wont to point out the
importance of the Principle of Non Contradiction in such contexts.) But
the practice was widespread, as one can see from the bemused report
of one of the authors of the Hippocratic Corpus:
He who is accustomed to hear speakers discuss the nature
of man beyond its relations to medicine will not find the
present account of any interest. For I do not say at all that
a man is air, or fire, or water, or earth, or anything else that
is not an obvious constituent of man; such accounts I leave
to those that care to give them. Those, however, who give
them have not in my opinion correct knowledge. For while
adopting the same idea they do not give the same account.
Though they add the same appendix to their ideas—saying
that ‘what is’ is a unity, and that this is both unity and the
all—yet they are not agreed as to its name. One of them
asserts that this one and the all is air, another calls it fire,
anther, water, and another, earth; while each appends to
his own account evidence and proofs that amounts to nothing. The fact that, while adopting the same idea, they do
not give the same account, shows that their knowledge too
is at fault. The best way to understand this is to be present
when they contradict (auteoisin antilegousin). Indeed, when
the same speakers contradict one another (pros allêlous antilegontes hoi autoi) in front of the same audience, the same
man never prevails in the debate (perigignetai en tôi logôi)
three times in succession, but now one is victor, now another,
now he who happens to have the most glib tongue in the face
of the crowd. Yet it is right that a man who claims correct
knowledge about the facts should maintain his own argument victorious always, if his knowledge be knowledge of
reality and if he set it forth correctly. But in my opinion
such men by their lack of understanding overthrow themselves in the words of their very discussions, and establish
the theory of Melissus.2 (Our italics.)
Without naming them, the author clearly describes the use of contradictory arguments, using the key word antilegontes, ‘they contradict’
in the italicized part. In what follows, we wish merely to propose the
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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outline of a reconstruction of the practice of ‘antilogikê’, in the time
span from Parmenides to Aristotle, i.e., from the 5 th to the 4 th century
B.C.E.. The reference here to Eleatic ideas, and Melissus in particular,
is particularly relevant for our purpose.
It goes without saying that every single historical claim we are
about to make is contested, but it is not our aim to argue in detail
for any of them here, over and above giving some brief textual indications and some references to the secondary literature. Furthermore,
we do not wish to present a ‘model’ for antilogikê in any logical or
mathematical sense of the word (and obviously not in the sense of
model-theoretical semantics). Our aim is to provide a reconstruction of
a practice, which can be said to provide a picture and, in that ordinary
sense only, a ‘model’. Although game semantics is guiding this reconstruction, we wish to steer clear of any specific approach.3 We still hope
that the following can be used as a template for further modifications—
this being merely an interim report for our own investigations—as well
as for further logical and linguistic investigations.4 In point of fact,
we think that the following gives an illustration of the value of game
semantics in the study of the history of logic.
In the first part of the paper, we will give a set of rules for dialectical
games,5 which will serve as our point of departure. In the second
part, we will look at some specific characteristics of what could be
the origin of these games, i.e. a peculiar form of inquiry by means
of contradicting arguments that clearly has its source in Parmenides’
Poem. We will conclude with some speculation about the origin of
logic.
1. DIALECTICAL GAMES

Our task of reconstructing the dialectical bouts we briefly described
above is extremely difficult, and our conclusions rather conjectural, for
a number of reasons, one of which being that so much that was written
has been lost.6 For example, Diogenes Laertius gives a series of titles by
Protagoras that include one treatise on The Art of Controversy (Tekhnê
eristikôn), another called Of Forensic Speech for a Fee, and two Books
of Opposing Arguments.7 At the very end of On Sophistical Refutations
(34, 183b34-36), Aristotle also mentions the Sophists:
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[. . . ] the training given by the paid professors of contentious
arguments was like the practice of Gorgias. For he used to
hand out rhetorical speeches to be learned by heart, and
they handed out speeches in the form of question and answer, which each supposed would cover most of the arguments on either side.8
These are also lost. We are fortunate to have Topics and On Sophistical
Refutations, taken together, as a complete handbook.9 But one has to
regret the loss of any prior handbook that would have given us a better
idea of the practice prior to Aristotle. This loss also made acute by the
fact that Aristotle may have introduced some subtle distortions in his
own handbook.
Perhaps the fragment known as Dissoi Logoi, which survived attached to Sextus Empiricus, if it is to be dated to the 380s or before,
would provide an example of such handbooks, since it partly fits the
description from Aristotle quoted above.10 Its first part is composed
of a series of four ‘double arguments’ where opposite conclusions are
argued for concerning the identity or distinctness of pairs of qualities,
e.g., ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘true and false’, followed by a series of single
speeches on topics such as ‘Is Virtue teachable?’—a topic that would
exercise Plato’s Socrates later on.11 But this is not yet what one is looking for. It is clear that these ‘double arguments’ stand opposed to the
epideictic orations (from the Greek epideixeis, ‘demonstrations’) of the
rhetoricians, but they do not proceed by short questions with yes/no
answers. The contrast is made plain in Plato’s Gorgias, when Socrates
forces the Sophist to answer his questions briefly:
SOCRATES: Well now Gorgias, would you be willing to
complete the discussion in the way we’re having it right
now, that of alternately asking questions and answering
them, and to put aside for another time this long style of
speechmaking like the one Polus began with?
GORGIAS: There are some answers, Socrates, that must be
given by way of long speeches. Even so, I’ll try to be as
brief as possible. This, too, in fact is one of my claims.
There’s no one who can say the same things more briefly
than I.
SOCRATES: That’s what we need Gorgias! Do give me a
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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presentation of this very thing, the short style of speech,
and leave the long style for some other time. (Gorgias,
449b-c)12
The contrast here is between ‘makrologia’ (long style) and ‘brakhulogia’
(short style),13 and Socrates explicitly links the latter to the ‘method of
the elenchus’. In Topics VIII, 2, 158a15-17, Aristotle also stated that
answers should be short and, ideally, ‘yes’ or ‘no’.14 This fully corresponds to the meaning of ‘antilogikê’ in Plato, e.g., not only here,
but in a good number of passages on dialectic (in ‘early’ dialogues
like Protagoras 335a, Gorgias 481d, and Lysis 216a, but also dialogues
in Plato’s ‘middle-period’ like Phaedrus 261d, Republic 454a & 539b).
There are of course many valuable illustrations of this practice in most
of Plato’s dialogues, including the early ‘Socratic’ ones, and even in
middle and late dialogues, e.g., in Book I of Republic, but the dialogues are often interrupted, and the answerer does not always keep
to short answers; there are also long speeches by both Socrates and by
his opponent, including references to myth, and so forth. It is nevertheless in Plato that we find the best example of dialectical exchanges,
i.e., the longest stretch of uninterrupted series of short questions and
answers, in the second half of Parmenides: in nearly thirty Stephanus
pages, from 137c to 166c, a young Aristotle—a character not supposed
to represent the philosopher—provides 532 short answers to questions
by Parmenides.15 The chains of questions and answers form about 180
arguments, commonly classified in eight or nine series of ‘deductions’.
Given the extreme complexity of this argument, it is rather unsurprising that no consensus has emerged amongst contemporary commentators about the very point of this second half.16
Plato’s dialogues do not merely contain numerous illustrations of
dialectic, they also include many instances of participants breaking off
the exchange to launch into precious ‘meta-discussions’, so to speak, reflecting on the way they proceed, e.g., in the case of a crucial methodological passage at Parmenides 135d-136c (to which we shall return)
to give instruction on how to structure a set of dialectical bouts around
a given thesis. With the help of these and of Books I and VIII of Topics,
coupled with On Sophistical Refutations, we came up with the following
rules:
1. Games always involve two players, which we will name accordVol. 8: Games, Game Theory
and Game Semantics
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ing to their initial roles: Questioner and Answerer, although this
is grammatically infelicitous.
2. A play begins with Questioner eliciting from Answerer his commitment to an assertion or thesis A.
3. The play then proceeds through a series of alternate questions
and answers. Questioner asks questions such that Answerer should
give short answers, ideally ‘yes’ or ‘no’.
4. In this way, Questioner elicits commitments from Answerer to further assertions B1 , B2 ,. . . , Bn , which form, taken together with A,
Answerer’s scoreboard:
{A, B1 , B2 ,. . . , Bn }.17
5. Questioner infers from B1 , B2 , . . . , Bn an impossibility (adunaton), namely that ¬A.
6. If Questioner has driven Answerer into a contradiction, the play
ends with Questioner winning; Answerer wins by avoiding being
driven into a contradiction. (Winning rule)
The whole procedure is the elenchus, properly speaking. Plato uses the
term ‘sullogizesthai’ at , meaning ‘taking together’ or ‘adding up’, on at
least one occassion:
Join me, then, in adding up (sullogisai) what follows for us
from our agreements. (Gorgias 498e)
Likewise for Aristotle, for whom ‘sullogismos’ is meant to refer to the act
of inferring the conclusion itself, and not to the whole ‘syllogism’.18 A
logical ‘compulsion’ is certainly felt, e.g., when, at the very end of Lesser
Hippias Socrates infers that someone who commits injustice voluntarily
is a better person than someone who commits injustice involuntarily:
HIPPIAS: I can’t agree with you in that Socrates.
SOCRATES: Nor I with myself. But given the argument, we
can’t help having it look that way to us, now, at any rate.
(Lesser Hippias 376b-c)

www.thebalticyearbook.org
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This compulsion can also be illustrated by a notorious passage towards
the end of Gorgias where Socrates refers to the conclusions that have
been reached as “bound by arguments of iron and adamant” (508e).
It is worth briefly digressing here on Aristotle’s definition of ‘syllogism’ (translated here as ‘deduction’):
A deduction is a discourse in which, certain things having
been supposed, something different from the things supposed results of necessity, because the things are so. (Prior
Analytics A 1, 24b18-20)
Aristotle never defines this notion of ‘resulting’ or ‘following of necessity’, all he ever does is to present moods of the first figure as ‘perfect’ or
‘complete’ syllogisms, because in their case nothing needs to be added
“for the necessity to be evident” (A 1, 24 b 22-25), and shows afterwards
how to reduce the moods of the other figures to those. Because of this
intuitive recognition of the validity of some basic cases and because his
use of schematic letters is best understood in terms of the pre-semantic
idea of interpretation by replacement,19 it would be wrong to attribute
to Aristotle a model-theoretical notion of logical consequence.20 Incidentally, it would also be wrong to think, as does Terry Penner, that
the lack of the full apparatus of model-theoretic semantics implies that
there is no elenchus deserving of the name (Penner 2007, 18). It is
merely that this apparatus is not suited to the study of antilogic.
That the word used is adunaton or ‘impossibility’, as opposed to,
say, our modern ‘absurdity’, merely reflects the fact that it is not possible to think both A and ¬A; Aristotle argues this very point in Metaphysics IV, 3 1005 b 11-34.21 The Principle of Non Contradiction (PNC)
is vital to antilogic, and it should not be surprising to find frequent
reference to it. As we shall see in the next section, it has its sources
in Parmenides’s Poem. So far as we know, the earliest straightforward
expression of it is in Gorgias’ Defence of Palamedes:
You have accused me in the indictment we have heard
of two most contradictory things, wisdom and madness,
things which cannot exist in the same man. When you
claim that I am artful and clever and resourceful, you are
accusing me of wisdom, while when you claim that I betrayed Greece, you accused me of madness. For it is madVol. 8: Games, Game Theory
and Game Semantics
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ness to attempt actions which are impossible, disadvantageous and disgraceful, the results of which would be such
as to harm one’s friends, benefit one’s enemies and render
one’s own life contemptible and precarious. And yet how
can one have confidence in a man who in the course of the
same speech to the same audience makes the most contradictory assertions about the same subjects? (Our italics)22
Gorgias’ point is that he who asserts A and ¬A in front of a court, “in the
course of the same speech to the same audience”, loses all credibility.
The same point is made in Plato’s Apology, when Socrates replies to his
cross examination:
You cannot be believed, Meletus, even, I think, by yourself.
The man appears to me, men of Athens, highly insolent
and uncontrolled. He seems to have made his deposition
out of insolence, violence and youthful zeal. He is like one
who composed a riddle and is trying it out: “Will the wise
Socrates realize that I am jesting and contradicting myself,
or shall I deceive him and others?” I think he contradicts
himself in the affidavit, as if he said: “Socrates is guilty of
not believing in gods but believing in gods”, and surely that
is the part of a jester.
Examine with me, gentlemen, how he appears to contradict himself, and you, Meletus, answer us. (Apology 26e27b)
There are further statements of the Principle in Gorgias 495e-496a,
Republic 436e-437a, 602e or Sophist 230b, and in Aristotle, in Prior
Analytics I 46, 52a 2-3 and in Metaphysics IV, 3, 1005b 23, where it
reads:
[. . . ] the same attribute cannot at the same time belong
and not belong to the same subject in the same respect.
Aristotle is notorious for the arguments he provides in support of PNC
in Metaphysics IV, 3–6, including in Metaphysics IV, 4 a transcendental
argument of sorts, involving the context of antilogic: he points out that
either a person asserts something meaningful, e.g., that some x has
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property F, or says nothing, but to say nothing is no basis for reasoning, and to use one’s meaningful assertion in reasoning implies having
to defend it qua Answerer; doing this, however, presupposes that the
assertion stands opposite to its contrary (that x does not have the property F). In other words, to assert is to be open to a challenge to defend
one’s assertion, and PNC is presupposed in any attempt to defend it.
So PNC is a condition of the possibility of any meaningful assertion.
There is an ambiguity concerning what the elenchus is supposed
to achieve. Under our view, in driving Answerer into a contradiction,
Questioner merely proved that the set of beliefs Answerer has committed himself to is inconsistent. But the usual view, pioneered by Gregory Vlastos in the case of Socrates, has it that, in deriving from Answerer’s scoreboard that ¬A, Socrates believed that, qua Questioner, he
had shown that ¬A is true and A false (Vlastos 1994, 11). This is obviously problematic, and led Vlastos to speak of a ‘problem of the Socratic
elenchus’ (Vlastos 1994, 3–4). Vlastos made no claim concerning other
putative players, only about Socrates, and, by extension, Plato in the
‘early’ dialogues. This is not the place for a discussion of Vlastos’ textual basis.23 Our fundamental objection to this view, over and above
the fact that it attributes an elementary logical mistake to Socrates, is
that it overlooks the fact that theses are to be included in Answerer’s
scoreboard not because they are true or known to be true, but merely
because Anwerer asserted or conceded them, i.e., because they are his
beliefs. To put it differently, a move from
A, B1 , B2 , . . . , Bn ⊢ ⊥
to
B1 , B2 , . . . , Bn ⊢ ¬A
is unobjectionable, but in the context of a dialectical game, even if
this is an appropriate description of the elenchus, there would be no
compelling reason to think that one should discard A rather than any
of B1 , B2 , . . . , Bn .24 This is a rather remarkable fact that Plato is aware
of, as one can see from Charmides 164c-d, where Critias, as Answerer
objects to Socrates:
But this [. . . ], Socrates, would never happen. And if you
think it necessary to draw this conclusion from what I admitted before, then I would rather withdraw some of my
Vol. 8: Games, Game Theory
and Game Semantics
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statements, and would not be ashamed to admit I made a
mistake, in preference to conceding that a man ignorant of
himself could be temperate.
What we have here is a case where Answerer prefers to withdraw one
of B1 , B2 , . . . , Bn rather than to concede ¬A.
These last remarks bring to the fore the key fact that it is Answerer’s
beliefs that are tested for consistency. This makes it all the more important that Questioner not surreptitiously introduce an additional thesis
in Answerer’s scoreboard, since then Answerer could avoid commitment
to ¬A by simply denying the thesis that Questioner had inserted. The
game would not have been a test of his beliefs, hence the necessity for
this key rule:
7. Questioner may not introduce any thesis, Answerer must commit
himself to any thesis used by Questioner. (Socratic Rule)
We call it the ‘Socratic Rule’ for the simple reason that it has clear motivation within Plato’s dialogues, since it explains both Socrates’ notorious ‘avowals of ignorance’, not only at the outset but also in the middle
of the game, e.g., in Lesser Hippias 372b-e, where its function is to enforce the ‘doxastic’ or ‘say what you believe’ constraint on Answerer
(e.g., at Protagoras 331c-d, Gorgias 472b-c & 550d, Charmides 166d-e,
or Republic 346a).25 The Socratic Rule bears some resemblances with
the Formal Rule in dialogical logic, this is why we were at first interested in the study of dialectic from that point of view. Given that we
have not given any details about dialogical logic here, we simply refer
the reader to our earlier work.26
Among other rules, brief mention should be made of the following:
8. There is a limit on the length of plays.
9. Delaying tactics are forbidden.
10. Fallacies are forbidden.
A passage at Theaetetus 172d-e suggests that philosophers, as opposed
to those who plead in law courts “with one eye on the clock”, did not
limit the length of plays. Yet Aristotle has two passages where the
existence of a practice of playing “against the time” is implied, e.g.,
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Topics, VIII, 10, 161a 9-12, where he clearly forbids playing against time
with inappropriate objections:
The fourth and poorest kind of objection is the one with
respect to time: for some people raise the sort of objection
that it would take longer to argue against than the present
discussion allows.27
Related to this is a ‘no delaying tactics’ rule at Topics, VII, 2, 158a 25–30.
As for fallacies, it is obvious that ‘apparent’ inferences to a contradiction must be forbidden, and Aristotle wrote On Sophistical Refutations
to teach his students how to spot these. It is quite remarkable that
his list of fallacies was almost fully illustrated already in the Euthydemus, which might have served the same pedagogical purpose within
the Academy.
In modern game semantics such as dialogical logic, one finds alongside structural rules a specific set of rules for the logical particles.
We do not give any here because none were made explicit until later,
maybe for the simple reason that they were naturally followed, as they
appear linked with interaction within a dialogue; what is truly needed
to further our understanding here is a proper account at the level of
linguistic theory of the interactive workings of dialogue.28
It is nevertheless worth pointing out the rule for induction (apagogê) at Topics, VIII, 2, 157a34-157b2:
When it happens that, after you have induced from many
cases, someone does not grant the universal, then it is your
right to ask him for an objection. However, when you have
not stated that it does hold of some cases, you have no
right to ask ‘of which cases does it not hold?’ For you must
previously carry out an induction to ask for an objection in
this way.29
The rule states that Questioner can introduce a universal proposition
only after having had Answerer concede instances, and that, once the
universal proposition is introduced, Answerer must in turn either grant
it or provide a putative counterexample. This is needed given that,
even with Answerer’s assent for few instances, there is no logical compulsion to concede the universal proposition.
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This rule is illustrated a number of times in Plato’s dialogues, e.g.,
in Lesser Hippias 366c-369b. Aristotle was very much aware of this,
as he explicitly mentioned this dialogue in Metaphysics, V, 29, 1025a613.30 This rule is of fundamental importance for him, since he derived
from the explanation of universal affirmative propositions that plays a
central role in his syllogistic:
We use the expression ‘predicated of every’ when none of
the subject can be taken of which the other term cannot be
said. (Prior Analytics, A 2, 24 b 28-29)
With help of the square of oppositions, it is possible to extend this to
the other three basic forms of propositions implicated in his syllogistic
rules.31
2. ELEATIC ANTILOGIC

The preceding observations were meant as an analysis of a single bout
concerning a single thesis A, and might be of help in understanding
how some of Plato’s dialogues, especially the early ‘Socratic’ ones, proceed. One should, however, distinguish this method of testing from antilogic, conceived now as a method of inquiry into problems for which
no empirical method could provide an answer. This method of antilogic involves testing not only A but also its contradictory ¬A.32 Only
one set of four arguments has survived extensively enough to exhibit
this structure: Parmenides’ B8 on the predicates of Being, Zeno’s arguments about divisibility, Gorgias’ ontological argument at the beginning
of his treatise On Not-Being, and the remarkable second part of Plato’s
Parmenides.33 In this section, our intention is not to address the substantial issues these arguments raise, e.g., concerning the semantics of
not-being, even less so to assess them; we would merely like to describe
some of the characteristics these arguments exhibit. This section may
thus be less interesting for logicians or linguists, more so for historians
of philosophy and logic.
As with the particular form of regimented debate, the origin of the
method is difficult to ascertain. Plato described Zeno in Phaedrus 261d
as the ‘Eleatic Palamedes’, i.e., as
[. . . ] such an artful speaker that his listeners will perceive
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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the same things to be both similar and dissimilar, both one
and many, both at rest and also in motion.
In line with the common usage, Plato called this ‘antilogic’. Yet he was
eager to stress that ‘antilogic’ should not only apply to long speeches
in front of an audience, but also to any sort of speech. He presented
the method as Zeno’s in the Parmenides, both at the beginning of the
dialogue and in an important methodological section which we will
quote from in a moment. Aristotle is also reported to have called Zeno
“the inventor of dialectics”.34 These are clear indications that Zeno
was a practitioner of dialectical games and followed the method of
antilogic. We will outline a demonstration of this below. But is he the
originator of the method?
There is, of course, no basis for the claim that Zeno’s teacher, Parmenides was himself a practitioner. We certainly make no such claim,
although we cannot exclude it, but merely note that the fact that he
wrote a hexameter poem expressing his positions does not exclude the
possibility that he may have arrived at them through antilogic (the contrary claim would be a non sequitur). Some of the features of his Poem
actually go a long way toward explaining the particular features of the
method of antilogic.
The section of Parmenides’ Poem we are interest in follows immediately after its introduction, known as the ‘proem’. It is composed of
fragments B2, B6, and B7 along with lines 1–2 and 15–16 of b8:
B2. Come now, and I will tell you [. . . ] the only ways of
enquiry that are to be thought of. The one, that [it] is and
that it is impossible for [it] not to be, is the path of Persuasion (for she attends upon Truth); the other, that [it] is
not and that it is needful that [it] not be, that I declare to
you is an altogether indiscernible track: for you could not
know what is not—that cannot be done—nor indicate it.
B6. What is there to be said and thought must needs be:
for it is there for being, but nothing is not. I bit you ponder that, for this is the first way of enquiry from which I
hold you back, but then from that on which mortals wander knowing nothing, two-headed, for helplessness guides
the wandering thought in their breasts, and they are carVol. 8: Games, Game Theory
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ried along, deaf and blind at once, dazed, undiscriminating
hordes, who believe that to be and not to be are the same
and not the same; and the path taken by them all is backward turning (palintropos).
B7. For never shall this forcibly be maintained, that things
that are not are, but you must hold back your thought from
this way of enquiry, nor let habit, born of much experience,
force you down this way, by making you use an aimless eye
or an ear and a tongue full of meaningless sound: judge
by reason the strife-encompassed trial (poluderis elenchus)
spoken by me.
B8. There still remains just one account of a way, that it
is.
[. . . ] And the decision about these things lies in this: it is
or it is not.35
One should note the mention of the poluderis elenchus, i.e., at the end
of B7. It implies that Parmenides saw the content of these passages
not as exhibiting a ‘refutation’, as this might be an incorrect translation
of elenchus, but rather a trial or a test. Parmenides is discussing here
possible routes or ways of enquiry, that start either with ‘it is’ (estin),
‘it is not’ (ouk estin), or a combination of both, suggested in B6: “to be
and not to be are the same and not the same”.36 It is these that have
to be tested.
We are interested in the deductive structure of his argument, in the
form of a double disjunctive syllogism with the premise:
A ∨ ¬A ∨ (A & ¬A)
This has been denied, but at an exorbitant price, that of affirming that
Parmenides had worse logical skills than Sextus Empiricus’ dog.37 On
the other hand, it must be said that accounts of the possible antilogical
structure of the Poem are, so far, not very sophisticated.38
In the briefest possible terms, Parmenides reasons as follows. One
of his tasks is to block the third way, ‘A & ¬A’. In essence, his argument
is that ‘A & ¬A’ is contradictory: the path is ‘palintropos’ or ‘backward
turning’. So one is left with the other two alternatives, and in B8 the
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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point is clearly expressed: “the decision about these things lies in this:
it is or it is not”. This is often read as the Law of Excluded Middle, but
Parmenides is asking for a choice between A and ¬A’, having eliminated
a combination of both as the third alternative. It is worth recalling here
the definition of exclusive disjunction:
(A ∨ B) & ¬ (A & B)
and to notice that Parmenides is in effect arguing that, the choice between A and ¬A has to be exclusive. His other task is to block the
second way, which he does in B2 with a short argument: “for you
could not know what is not—that cannot be done—nor indicate it”.
The point seems to be that one cannot even begin travelling down that
path, because it is ‘indiscernible’.39 Finally, the beginning of B8 simply
affirms the result of a double application of the disjunctive syllogism
to the starting premise: “There still remains just one account of a way,
that it is”.
To see what possible connection this argument might have with
antilogic, we have to keep in mind that Parmenides has been talking
about submitting to a test three ways of enquiry: A, ¬A, and ‘A & ¬A’,
all of which are incompatible with one another. And it is clear at least
that the third way is rejected because it immediately leads to contradiction.40 This suggests that one way to test both A and ¬A is to look
for contradictions on both sides. This is not exactly Parmenides standpoint, given that he argues for no contradiction on one side, namely
that of ‘it is’ (estin) taken simpliciter as ‘it is there for being’ (esti einai,
B6), but this is enough to get us going.
Before moving on to Zeno, we would like to point out another characteristic of the Poem that arguably has its roots in antilogic. If one is to
look for contradictions, so simple an assertion as ‘it is’, especially since
it is not paradoxical or self-refuting, will not be enough on its own.
One needs to appeal to a set of predicates to try and engender contradictions, i.e., to travel down that path, as Parmenides would say. These
are part/whole, limited/unlimited, etc. As we shall see, Parmenides’
carefully chosen set of predicates in B8 is also to be found in Zeno,
Gorgias, and Plato.
For our brief presentation of Zeno’s arguments about divisibility,
we chose as our point of departure Plato’s Parmenides. That his remarks on Zeno may be taken as reliable has been controverted, and
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it is rather certain that the meeting between Parmenides, Zeno, and
Socrates is imaginary, but it seems equally wrong to think that, given
Plato’s limited audience in his own time, he could have written anything fanciful about Zeno. In the opening pages, there is a precious
exchange between young Socrates and Zeno, concerning Zeno’s book,
which is reported here to have been written in defence of the monism
of his master, Parmenides, against the contradictory thesis that ‘it is
many’ (esti ta polla). Socrates first asks:
Is this the point of your arguments—simply to maintain, in
opposition to everything that is commonly said, that things
are not many? And do you suppose that each of your arguments is proof for this position, so that you think you give
as many proofs that things are not many as your book has
arguments?41 Is that what you’re saying—or do I misunderstand? (127e)
To which Zeno replied:
No [. . . ]. On the contrary, you grasp the general point of
the book splendidly. (127e–128a)
One might infer from this that Zeno is, in the fashion of Vlastos’ ‘Socratic elenchus’ discussed above, providing numerous instances of reductio ad absurdum for the thesis ‘it is many’, thus proving as many
times that ‘it is one’. But Zeno adds a little bit further on in the conversation:
Still, you haven’t completely discerned the truth about my
book [. . . ] The truth is that the book comes to the defence
of Parmenides’ argument against those who try to make
fun of it by claiming that, if it is one, the consequence for
the argument is to suffer many things both ridiculous and
contradictory to it (polla kai geloia sumbainei paskhein tôi
logôi kai enantia hautôi). Accordingly my book contradicts
(antilegei) those who assert the many and pays them back
in kind with something for good measure. Since it aims
to make clear that their hypothesis, if it is many, would,
if someone examined the matter thoroughly, suffer consequences even more ridiculous than those suffered by the
hypothesis if its being one. (128b–d)42
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Zeno’s revised claim here is that he merely drew contradictions from
the opposite thesis in order to contradict it, and this is in line with the
conception of antilogic developed in this paper. It is interesting to note
that Zeno says here that he is giving a reply to critics of Parmenides
who already argued in the same manner as he did. This ‘game of contradicting’ had probably been going on since Parmenides, who could
very well be arguing contra a rival school.
Zeno’s four arguments about divisibility are the only surviving set
which is extensive enough for us to draw some conclusions concerning
his method. Aristotle himself frequently alludes to these arguments as
being ‘against motion’, a frequent misunderstanding.43 Under a reading harking back to the opening pages of the Parmenides, and revived
in the 19 th century in Paul Tannery’s seminal paper,44 they are meant to
defend Parmenides’ monism by deriving contradictions from the contrary hypothesis, ‘if it is many’ (ei polla esti). It is true that the contradictions involve motion, but they are not against motion. To recall
Plato’s words in the Phaedrus 261d, “his listeners will perceive the same
things to be [. . . ] both at rest and also in motion” (our italics).
In antilogical form the arguments would (roughly) run like this.
Zeno would secure agreement from his adversary that ‘there is motion’, a typical endoxa if there is one (and one that must have been
brought against Parmenides, since for him Being does not undergo any
change). Next, supposing that ‘it is many’, suppose that ‘space and
time are divisible’ (to assume the contrary would lead one into immediate difficulties). He would then raise a question of the form ‘Is it A
or ¬A?’, namely: ‘Are they infinitely divisible or not?’ Supposing that
the adversary chooses infinite divisibility, with ‘The Stadium’,45 Zeno
would get his adversary to concede that the runner wishing to reach
the other end of a stadium would not move, because he would have
first to traverse its first half, then the first half of the first half, and so
forth ad infinitum.46 If, however, the adversary were to choose instead
that space and time are only finitely divisible, i.e., that there are indivisible minima, then by ‘The Arrow’,47 Zeno would get him to concede
the claim that an arrow in flight must be motionless in an instant, because if it were to change position, the instant would be divisible. So
the arrow is always at rest.
Thus Zeno provided two arguments: one for A (infinite divisibility)
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and one for ¬A (finite divisibility). As we know, however, the ‘paradoxes’ come in pairs: ‘The Moving Rows’ is, like ‘The Arrow’, also an
argument deriving a contradiction from the claim that ‘space and time
consist of indivisible minima’, while ‘The Achilles’ complements the
‘The Stadium’ for the opposite supposition. Why four arguments divided in pairs? The answer is in the methodological passage towards
the middle of Parmenides, where Parmenides tells the young Socrates:
take as an example this hypothesis that Zeno entertained:
if many are, what the consequences must be for the many
themselves in relation to themselves and in relation to the
one, and for the one in relation to itself and in relation
to the many? And, in turn, on the hypothesis, if many
are not, you must again examine what the consequences
will be both for the one and for the many in relation to
themselves and in relation to each other. (136a–b)
Using this as a cue, we can see that in each pair, one argument derives a
contradiction from a body’s motion considered in itself, these are ‘The
Arrow’ and ‘The Stadium’, while the other arguments, ‘The Achilles’
and ‘The Moving Rows’, derive a contradiction from a body’s motion
in relation to the movement of another body. So the arguments about
divisibility would be structured like this:48
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(or ‘unity’) are deduced (1st Hypothesis) that are at first negative (first
series of deduction) and then positive (second series of deduction), and
so forth, and organized around the distinction between ‘in itself’ and
‘in relation to others’, to give the following structure:49

A proper understanding of the structure of these arguments is no
idle task, given the historical importance of Neoplatonist readings of
the dialogue, which read the first deduction of the first hypothesis as a
form of negative theology meant to reveal an unknowable and ineffable
God beyond reality. Such readings destroy the antilogical structure of
the second part of the Parmenides, as well as leaving unexplained the
presence of the other series of deductions.50
The arguments of the second part of Parmenides also share two
further features with Parmenides’ poem. First, there is the odd case of
a third series of deductions under the 1st hypothesis, at 155e–157b, of
the form ‘A & ¬A’:
If the one is [. . . ] both one and many and neither one nor
many. (155e)

This example should illustrate the method of antilogic. Although it is
not possible even to begin arguing for this point properly, one could
suggest that this is also the structure of the eight series of deductions
in the second half of Parmenides (137c–166c). Indeed, in the very
same fashion, the arguments are structured around the supposition ‘If
it is one’ (ei hen estin) and its negation, and consequences for the ‘one’
www.thebalticyearbook.org

This is reminiscent of Parmenides’ third way. As a matter of fact, the
first hypothesis as a whole thus looks very ‘Parmenidian’, since it investigates in turn, A, ¬A and ‘A & ¬A’. This is also the structure of
Gorgias’ ontological argument at the beginning of his treatise On NotBeing,51 since he derives contradictions in every branch of this hypothesis:
If anything exists either it is the existent that exists or the
non-existent, or both the existent and the non-existent exist.52
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Likewise, Gorgias goes on deriving contradictions for the three paths,
blocking them all.
This feature, typical of Eleatic antilogic, has disappeared in Aristotle, who has bouts beginning with problems of the form ‘Is it A or ¬A?’
(Topics I, 4, 101 b 32–33 and VII, 2, 158 b 14–25). For example, Aristotle in De Caelo, I, 10, 297 b 4 f., the question is ‘Is the world eternal or
not?’. It is an important point to make in relation to the interpretation
of Aristotle that he kept the idea of an enquiry that would first proceed
by deriving contradictions on both sides of a problem and frequently
speaks in this context of aporia—‘difficulties’ or ‘puzzles’—as in Nicomachean Ethics VII, 1145 b 2–7:
We must, as in all other cases, set out the phenomena
before us and, after first [going through all the] difficulties, go on to prove, if possible, the truth of all the reputable opinions about these affections or, failing this, of the
greater number and the most authoritative; for if we both
resolve the difficulties and leave the reputable opinions
undisturbed, we shall have proved the case sufficiently.53
Aristotle further points out in Topics, VI, 6, 145 b 17–20 that aporiai
emerge precisely when, ‘going through the difficulties on either side’,
the results turn out to be equally puzzling:
Likewise also an equality between contrary reasonings would
seem to be a cause of perplexity; for it is when we reflect
on both sides of a question and find everything alike to be
in keeping with either course that we are [puzzled] about
which one we are to do. (Translation slightly modified.)
The most significant example of this is Metaphysics Book III, which
contains a discussion of 14 such aporiai, about which Aristotle simply does not tell us which side he takes.54 That Aristotle believed that
this method of antilogic, i.e., ‘going through the difficulties on either
side’ is a necessary condition for philosophy, is expressed at Topics, VIII,
14, 163 b 9–16:
[. . . ] when it comes to knowledge and the wisdom that
comes from philosophy, being able to discern—or having
already discerned—the consequences of either assumption
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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is no small instrument: for it remains to choose one or the
other of these rightly. In order to do that, one must be
naturally gifted with respect to truth: to be properly able
to choose the true and avoid the false. This is just what the
naturally good are able to do, for it is by loving and hating
in the right way whatever is presented to them that they
judge well what is best.
There is an exact correspondence with Aristotle’s own practice, as he
begins his treatises in this way.55
One final point about predicates. We noted earlier that, suppositions such as ‘it is one’ not being evidently self-contradictory, one
needs, in order to derive contradictions, to consider the bearing of the
suppositions on a set of qualifications, such as limited/unlimited, motion/rest, equal/unequal, etc. As Reginald Allen once noticed, the list
of the qualifications in the Parmenides “reflects the Eleatic tradition”,
as the list is almost fully represented in Parmenides’ Poem (B8), and
“may indeed conform to the principal divisions of Zeno’s book” (Allen
1983, 188 & 306-307n. 80). If we also list predicates involved in Gorgias’ ontological argument, we find a remarkable overlap, even though
we do not have, in the case of Zeno, a complete set of arguments. The
following table, from a partial list, should suffice to illustrate our point:

Aristotle also proposed a list of ‘categories’ in Topics I 9, 103 b 20–26:
Now, then, next after this we must distinguish the categories of predications in which the four <types of> predication mentioned are found. These are ten in number:
what-it-is, quantity, quality, relation, location, time, position, possession, doing, undergoing. An accident, a genus,
a unique property, and a definition will always be in one
of these categories, for all the premises <produced> by
means of them signify either a what-it-is, or a quantity, or
a quality, or some one of the other categories.
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This list is of course very closely related to the ten-fold division in the
Categories (there is only a difference in the name of the first category).
In his notes to the Categories, J. L. Ackrill suggested that Aristotle arrived at his list of categories by reflecting on questions, e.g., noticing
that
An answer to ‘where?’ could not serve as an answer to
‘when?’. (Ackrill 1963, 78)
This view has been debated since by commentators, but we feel it
must be on the right track: our suggestion would be that Aristotle’s
list originates in the practice of question and answer. There are some
major differences, however, between Aristotle and his predecessors in
this respect. While they used a specific set of contradictory predicates
that had been carefully selected originally by Parmenides for his own
purposes, Aristotle was far more encompassing and systematic in his
classification of predicates of Greek language. Furthermore, Aristotle’s
classification is not in terms of pairs of contradictory predicates. Nevertheless, the presence of the list of categories in Topics I 9 suggests
that his systematic study was for the purpose of advancing knowledge
of the predicates involved in antilogic. After all, Topics is a handbook
to teach players how to excel in the game, and categories are involved
in an essential way in the topoi.
3.

CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE ORIGIN OF LOGIC

Logic is reputed to have originated in Aristotle’s syllogistic and in the
writings of Stoics such as Chrysippus. The study of logic in Ancient
philosophy was renewed in the last century following the advent of
modern logic, in particular by Jan Łukasiewicz, but in his study of
Prior Analytics,56 he did not take antilogic into consideration, and he
forced upon the text a particular syntactic approach, that of axiomatics, that clearly did not fit it; he ended up claiming that syllogisms are
not valid inferences but true universalized conditionals, and portrayed
syllogistic not as the underlying logic of the theory of demonstrations
in Posterior Analytics, but as a logic of terms that presupposed in turn a
propositional logic as underlying logic.57 He thus faulted Aristotle for
having ignored the latter, and rightly credited the Stoics for its invention. Under those conditions, it is difficult to see why Aristotle should
www.thebalticyearbook.org

24

Antilogic

be considered the inventor of logic, as we understand the term, if only
because of, say, his use of schematic letters.58
This is not the place for a critique of this approach, already severely
undermined since pioneering work by Timothy Smiley and John Corcoran in the 1970s.59 We would like simply to say a word about Aristotle’s
context. Much of the work in the history of logic in this tradition has
shown a remarkable lack of sensitivity to it. With Łukasiewicz, history of logic looked more like an attempt at fitting Aristotle’s text onto
the Procrustean bed of one’s own axiomatic conception of logic, and,
although work by Smiley and Corcoran certainly fitted the text much
better, it was also ahistorical. We simply submit that antilogic was an
essential part of the context within which both Aristotle and the Stoics
introduced their ideas. The guiding ideas of game semantics allowed
us to reconstruct antilogic, and rules 1–5 indicate that bouts proceeded
in two basic steps: first, in a series of questions and answers, Questioner
was able to elicit agreement from Answerer to the theses that entail the
contradictory of the thesis with which the bout started, and, secondly,
from these Questioner inferred the impossibility (adunaton). The logical steps at the end of the bouts were at first not made explicit in terms
of rules of inference because of their intuitive obviousness, but it is not
surprising that Aristotle, and later on the Stoics, would search for rules
here, so as to teach their players which premises they needed to perform in order to undergo an elenchus successfully.60 Now what was thus
made explicit, we have not inquired into yet. This is a task for logicians
and linguists, and we merely propose the foregoing as the basis for this
investigation. Antilogic was an essentially enactive conception of logic,
where the role of the second player was crucial, something only game
semantics allows us to recover. Given the importance of antilogic for
philosophical enquiry, playing was more important than metatheoretic
reflection, but that should not mean that the likes of Zeno, Gorgias and
Plato should not count among the most remarkable logicians in history.
Notes
1
The expression ‘Socratic elenchus’ would lead one to believe that either Socrates
invented the method or that no one used it after him or both. These claims, however,
can only be upheld by blatantly disregarding a large amount of evidence pointing to
widespread use of that word prior to and after Socrates. Terminological issues are also
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complicated by the fact that the words ‘dialektike’ and ‘eristike’ were at first used to
describe the same method, but the latter took on negative connotations, often associated
with the Sophists, whose name became synonymous with misuses of the method, for
which we now have the word ‘sophistry’, while the former came to acquire a variety of
meanings that have nothing to do with the ‘method of the elenchus’. But these points
should not detain us. See Nehamas (1990) for a discussion on ‘dialectic’, ‘eristic’ and
‘antilogic’ in Plato.
2
On the Nature of Man, I. Translation from Jones (1947), modified.
3
Previous work in the wake of Lorenzen, includes Ebbinghaus (1964); Krabbe (2006);
Castelnérac & Marion (2009); Rahman & Keiff (2010); Marion & Rückert (unpublished).
Our reason for eschewing any reference to dialogical logic is to keep our presentation at
the most general level, unrestricted by any specific ties to the latter.
4
A possible line of inquiry that we have in mind is the study of Plato’s dialogues, as
illustrations of dialectical games, from the standpoint of ludics. Alain Lecomte and Myriam Quatrini have applied ludics to the study of dialogue as a game; see, e.g., Lecomte
& Quatrini (2011), and Part IV of Lecomte (2011). This could usefully be applied to
the study of Plato’s dialogues, to learn more about the way they function—one of us
is currently working with Alain Lecomte in applying this setting to the study of Lesser
Hippias.
5
Also called ‘dialectical games’ in Castelnérac & Marion (2009).
6
Another reason is the very nature of dialectical games, as any report of these verbal
encounters would have been from memory. Furthermore, there was no literary style
that would have consisted of straightforward reports of particular dialectical bouts. The
closest we have to this is one short argument in Aristophanes’ Clouds, some pages in
Xenophon, and the highly elaborate works of Plato. Worse, famed practitioners such as
Socrates or Arcesilaus would not commit anything to writing. Therefore, arguments with
a dialectic origin were for the most part written down in a form that was not ‘dialogical’.
Some arguments, such as the Sorites, clearly retained their dialectical form, others did
not and one has to use care in reconstructing them. We shall see an example of the issues
involved below with Zeno’s arguments about divisibility.
7
Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, IX, 8, 55. Here ‘opposing arguments’ translates ‘antilogion’
8
Aristotle wanted also to contrast, at the end of On Sophistical Refutations, his own
Topics with the unsystematic teachings of the Sophists. The latter is organized in eight
books, with the first and last ones providing a description of the games and their rules,
along with some advice to the players, while the intervening 6 books are a catalogue
of more than 300 topoi, i.e., ‘places’ or ‘locations’, the purpose of which is, as Jacques
Brunschwig so aptly put it, “to frame premises from a given conclusion” (Brunschwig
1967, xxxix). For example, given that the answerer asserts A, the questioner must then
drive him into a contradiction, i.e., to find ways of having him concede ¬A, and the
appropriate topos is meant to help the questioner find the further premises needed to
entail ¬A, so that he has to first get the proponent to concede these, and only then to
draw the inference to the contradiction. All of this is lacking in texts such as Dissoi Logoi,
hence Aristotle’s pride at 34, 183 b 36 & 184 b 1 that nothing of the sort existed before
him. In this respect, it is quite interesting to note that in this last passage, he also claims
that his work is the result of “experimental researches”; this implies having played an
incredible amount of games.
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9
In the very same passage Aristotle mentions his “present inquiry” and this is meant
to cover both books, so On Sophistical Refutations should simply be seen as the ninth and
final book of Topics.
10
See Dillon & Gergel 2003, 320–333).
11
Dupréel (1922); Dupreél (1948) thought the resemblance between the Dissoi logoi
and Plato’s dialogue so conspicuous that he accused the latter of simply plagiarizing the
sophists; of course, this is going too far, but it is true that Plato is not purely original in
the topics he chose and the way his characters argue against one another.
12
The contrast is also drawn with other prominent Sophists: Hippias in Lesser Hippias,
373a, and Protagoras in Protagoras 334c-d. In both cases, a wily Socrates invokes his
lack of memory, but the most important reason he invokes is that speeches, like books,
do not answer questions, at Protagoras, 329a-b. (This is, of course, in line with Socrates’
notorious critique of writing at Phaedrus 276a-d.) This contrast should not mislead one
into thinking that the Sophists were not skilled in the art of dialectical games, as he portrays both Protagoras and Gorgias as capable of playing them at, respectively Protagoras,
335a and Gorgias, 449b-c, quoted here. Given what we know of them, and their popularity when they were alive, to claim the contrary would have been odd, especially in his
days. Gorgias’ treatise On Not-Being is certainly a dialectical tour de force.
13
From which are derived the modern words ‘macrology’ and ‘brachylogy’, with slightly
different connotations.
14
As it happens, Plato’s dialogues do not merely contain ‘yes/no interrogatives’, as
‘wh-interrogatives’ also frequently occur. Aristotle, however, insisted in this passage that
dialectical games should contain only ‘yes/no interrogatives’ and showed how to transform some ‘wh-interrogatives’ into ‘yes/no interrogatives’: instead of asking ‘What is the
F’, e.g., ‘What is courage?’, one simply has to ask a disjunction ‘Is courage X or not X?’
15
For a full analysis, see Brisson (1984).
16
Still, this is a historically important text, given that it is a key to Neoplatonism, and
that the latter played an important role in the reception of Plato from the Renaissance onwards. It is fitting to note that the modern commentator closest to Neoplatonic readings
of the second part of Parmenides, F. M. Cornford also translated it as a simple monologue,
factoring away the young Aristotle’s answers, thereby erasing the dialectical dimension
and what it may bring to the understanding of the text (Cornford 1939).
17
The notion of ‘scoreboard’ comes from Lewis (1983) essay 13. One could alternatively speak of a ‘commitment store’, following Hamblin (1970).
18
See Crubellier 2011, 25–26.
19
See Lear 1980, 8. For more on the intuitionist notion of ‘interpretation by replacement’, see Dummett 1977, 218f.
20
It would be interesting to relate this approach, based on an intuitive recognition of
the validity of some basic cases, to John Etchemendy’s notorious critique in Etchemendy
(1990) of the model-theoretical account of logical consequence as being unable to capture the intuitive notion of the validity of an inference.
21
The argument has a strong realist flavour: anyone rejecting the Principle of Non
Contradiction and who entertains contradictory beliefs would amount to a self-contradictory object, as these contradictory beliefs would be contradictory attributes of the
same subject, and this cannot be the case,. See Evans 1999, 139.
22
DK 82 B 11, §25. Translation in Dillon & Gergel 2003, 90–91.
23
See, e.g., Benson (1995). See also, below, the discussion of Zeno in the opening
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pages of Parmenides.
24
Donald Davidson, who saw here connections with his own ideas in ‘A Coherence
Theory of Truth and Knowledge’ (Davidson 2001), pointed out that, according to Vlastos,
Plato must have realized “what must be assumed if the elenchus is to produce truths: the
assumption is that, in moral matters, everyone has true beliefs which he cannot abandon
and which entail the negations of his false beliefs” (Davidson 2005, 229). Thus Socrates
was, according to Davidson, in possession of a “method that leads to truth” (Davidson
2005, 239), throughout gradual elimination of false beliefs. It seems to us that the
same objection can be made here, given that the point of dialectical games is to test the
consistency of sets of beliefs: there is never a guarantee that one has eliminated false
beliefs rather than true ones. It is always possible that the consistent set one ends up
with contains only false beliefs, so the possibility of massive error remains open.
25
See Vlastos 1994, 13-17). For more details see Castelnérac & Marion 2009, 57–59.
For Socrates’ avowals of ignorance, see Castelnérac & Marion 2009, 61–62).
26
The Formal Rule has no parallel in other forms of game semantics. See Castelnérac
& Marion 2009, 61 and section 5 of Marion & Rückert (unpublished) for detailed explanations.
27
The other passage is at Sophistical Refutations, 34, 185a25.
28
See endnote 4 above.
29
The rule is also stated at Topics, VIII, 8, 160b1-6. It is also related to the rule for universal quantification in dialogical logic, see section 6 in Marion & Rückert (unpublished)
for a detailed discussion.
30
Aristotle even attributes to Socrates the invention of inductive arguments (Metaphysics, XIII, 4, 1078 b 28). This was common knowledge in the 19th century, and thus
far the only logical skill broadly attributed to Socrates.
31
For a detailed discussion of these last points, see Marion & Rückert (unpublished).
32
This is what we called the ‘method of dialectical games’ in Marion & Rückert (unpublished).
33
Other arguments by Zeno and further arguments by Melissus were probably of this
nature, but the little that we have in our possession is too fragmentary for a reconstruction. For an example of an antilogical reconstruction of an argument by Melissus, see
Makin (2005).
34
Sextus Empiricus, Against Logicians, I, 7, and Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent
Philosophers, IX, 25.
35
Respectively, §§291, 293, 24 and 295 in Kirk et al. (1983), modified.
36
Not all commentators agree as to the existence of this third way, see, e.g., the arguments in Curd 2004, 51–63).
37
Sextus Empiricus, Outline of Pyrrhonism, I, 69. For this particular claim, see Lesher
(1984), 13. In all fairness to Lesher, such odd claims about the structure of the argument
have practically disappeared from the revised (Lesher 2002).
38
The locus classicus here remains Montgomery Furth’s claim that “the essence of Parmenides’s procedure [is] that he is not at this point putting forth an ontology of his own,
but is practicing dialectical criticism” (Furth 1968, 118).
39
On a reading that takes ‘estin’ as both existential and predicative, that this second
way is ‘indiscernible’ may mean that no clear thought can be expressed by a negative
existential proposition.
40
Parmenides is no ‘dialetheist’ in the sense of Priest (2002).
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41
Proclus, possibly one of the last persons to have seen it, reported that it contained 40
logoi in his Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, 694, 23 f. See Morrow & Dillon (1987),
72.
42
Translation slightly modified.
43
For example, in Prior Analytics B 17, 65 b 18–19 or Topics, Θ, 8 160 b 8–9.
44
See Tannery (1885).
45
At least under the version at Physics Z 9, 239 b 11.
46
The version reported at Physics, Θ 8, 263a 15–18, 263 b 3–9 has it that a runner could
not reach the other end of a stadium because he would have to traverse an infinity of
points in a finite time, which is impossible, although a runner can reach the other end of
a stadium.
47
See Physics Z 9, 239 b 5–7.
48
This reading is hardly new, it was suggested by the historian of Greek mathematics,
Sir Thomas Heath in Heath 1921, vol. 1, 273–283), and developed since by G. E. L.
Owen in ‘Zeno and the Mathematicians’ (Owen 1986).
49
This reconstruction is partly based on Gill & Ryan 1996, 57–58 and Brisson 1999,
46, and needs to be confirmed by a detailed exegesis. This approach depends on taking
the phrases ‘pros heauto’ and ‘pros ta alla’, i.e., ‘in relation to itself’ and ‘in relation to
the others’ to have a non-technical, straightforward meaning, and differs in this from
Meinwald 1991, chap 3).
50
For a critique see Dodds (1928) and Allen 1983, 189–195.
51
Of which there are two versions: Sextus Empiricus’ Against Logicians VII, 65f. and
Pseudo-Aristotle’s On Melissus, Xenophanes and Gorgias, 979a 12 f. For a comparative
study of the structure of Gorgias’ argument in both versions, see Castelnérac (forth.).
52
We quote here from Sextus Empiricus, Against Logicians, VII, 65, translation in Dillon
& Gergel 2003, 68.
53
Translation slightly modified.
54
See Crubellier & Laks (2009).
55
For this point, see, e.g., Brunschwig 1967, xvi–xvii) or Smith 1997, xvii–xix).
56
See Łukasiewicz (1957).
57
See Łukasiewicz (1968).
58
On this point, see, inter alia, Corcoran (1974b) and Corcoran (2009).
59
The key papers here are Smiley (1973) and Corcoran (1974a). See also Lear (1980)
and Smith (1989), which incorporates the Smiley-Corcoran approach in the translation
and commentary.
60
This idea was first expressed in Hintikka (1993). See also Hintikka 2007, 3, Castelnérac & Marion 2009, 78 and Crubellier 2011, 25.
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